Debt Relief for Child Survival by Green, Reginald H.
DRAFT
DEBT RELIEF FOR CHILD SURVIVAL
1. Children individually and nationally are the hope for, agents to achieve,
and justification of development. They are families' and nations' most
precious assets. Parents, communities and governments care deeply that 
their children are fed, clothed, provided with health care, educated 
because only if this is done can a better future be achieved. People in 
poor countries do share the hope and faith expressed by the late 
President Samora Machel of Mozambique when he said "We must look for our 
reward in the faces of our children, the flowers that do not wither". It 
is morally imperative for the global community, and especially its richer 
members, to cooperate with them in achieiving that end.
2. But poor children in poor countries are also the most vulnerable members
of their communities. Diarrhoea, measles and other cheaply preventable 
or controllable diseases interacting with malnutrition and lack of access 
to pure water and sanitation kill thousands of poor children in poor 
countries every day. The faces of starving children we have seen on 
television, e.g. from Ethiopia, Mali and Mozambique - many of them 
already dead by the time we saw their images - should concentrate our 
minds on a simple fact set out in question and answer form on a 1985 
UNICEF poster. A poor child from a poor country is asked "What do you 
want to be when you grow up?" The answer is "Alive." Child survival 
cannot wait. Even if young children do survive disease, malnutrition, 
drought or war-imposed displacement and other perils, many are quite 
literally physically or mentally crippled for life. The flowers are 
being cut off or stunted, the hoped for reward brutally denied.
3. This is both humanly and economically unacceptable. Child survival can 
be increased dramatically at low cost. Oral rehydration, vaccination, 
growth charts, education for breast feeding, primary health care more 
generally, targetted supplementary feeding are very low cost programmes. 
Quite the reverse - at national level filling in the' gaps in primary 
health care would often cost little more or even less than the running
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expenses of one or two major metropolitan hospitals. Similarly, 
increased food and other crop production by poor farm households and by 
women is now recognised to be crucial for development and for food 
security. When properly designed programmes to promote them are highly 
cost efficient. They are equally crucial to and efficient for child 
survival. Relief measures are necessary so that children do survive but 
they cannot be a general, permanent solution. The healthy well fed child 
in a household unable to meet its basic needs and in particular suffering 
from serious malnutrition is no more operationally practicable than 
socially or humanly acceptable. Child focused survival and development 
must include mother and poor household income generation focused 
components as well as primary health care and supplementary feeding.
4. In many cases quite modest resource allocations and reallocations have 
increased chances of poor children’s survival dramatically. Examples 
have been cited throughout recent UNICEF’s State of the World's Children 
reports. They are consistent with an economically as well as socially 
viable approach to development more generally as sketched in Within Human 
Reach - A Future For Africa’s Children. One is not talking about 
utopianism or abstract theory but about manageable, experience tested 
approaches.
5. The tragedy is that we do know the threats to child survival and the 
means to reduce them; that we do have evidence that these means work; but 
that in general and especially for poor children in poor countries 
resources available for and devoted to child survival focused programmes 
are falling in real terms. To a very significant extent this is the 
result of the global recession of the early 1980s and the continuing 
deterioration of the international economic environment confronting low 
income countries. A major element in that deterioration has been the 
combination of falling commodity prices and rising external debt service 
requirements. The 1985 State of the World’s Children report's section on 
the impact of the recession on children and the subsequent fuller 
exposition in a special issue of World Development demonstrate this 
concretely on a country by country basis over a wide range of countries. 
Real resources per capita deployed for child survival and development are 
falling. This is especially true in poor countries and most especially 
in the poor countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. An African proverb sums up
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the nutritional aspect very succinctly, "Give a rich man less food and he 
will grow thin. Give a thin man less food and he will die.”
6. UNICEF has consistently stressed the need for structural adjustment and 
for more efficient allocation of resources. Its 1985 study, Within Human 
Reach, the 1987 State Of The World’s Children Report and a forthcoming 
volume on Adjustment With A Human Face are proposals for structural 
adjustment and for more efficient allocation of resources. UNICEF's 
proposals do diverge from more traditional prescriptions in focus and 
coverage. Of course reducing imbalances in government budgets and in 
external balances is important. Equally it is important to focus on 
rehabilitation of directly productive and infrastructural investment and 
on restoring exports in order to regain more adequate import capacity. 
But focussing only on these elements is dangerously - often fatally - 
incomplete. Programmes supporting poor people and enabling them to 
increase their earned incomes are integral to, structural adjustment and 
to efficient resource redeployment. Without them the fabric of society 
is greatly strained or even rent and many poor children are quite 
literally fatally affected. That cannot be a sound basis for survival, 
for rehabilitation or renewed development. For the dead there is no 
future, for those stunted and maimed by child malnutrition no humanly 
acceptable future. Child survival and a priority for the poor are among 
the core elements in properly defined structural adjustment and efficient 
resource allocation. This is not - or at any rate is no longer - an 
eccentric view associated with UNICEF, the ILO and non-economists. It 
has been stressed in recent studies of the World Bank, in major speeches 
by the IMF Managing Director and in an increasing body of hard economic 
analysis.
7. What prevents many poor economies and their governments - especially but 
not only in Sub-Saharan Africa - from acting on this growing consensus? 
Why are child survival focused resources per capita - whether narrowly or 
broadly defined - still declining? Apart from domestic obstacles - which 
in many cases have been largely overcome, or are being, overcome quite 
rapidly - there are two main constraints:
1. inadequate government revenue - sometimes even blocking use of child 
focused external support because the domestic component cannot be
provided and in a majority of poor countries severely constraining 
acting on identified priorty child focused programmes;
2. inadequate foreign exchange - while relatively low in import 
intensity, child survival and poor household earned income 
enhancement programmes do require some imports, e.g. vaccines, 
refrigerators, vehicles, water pumps and spares, simple agricultural 
implements or the nuts, bolts and steel to make them.
As is increasingly recognised, the servicing of high levels of external 
debt makes both constraints far more binding. Because a large proportion 
of government revenue is devoted external debt servicing, less financial 
and real resources are available for funding other expenditures, 
including those which increases nutrition, health and income levels of 
poor people. Similarly, when a large proportion of a country's export 
earnings is devoted to servicing external debt, less of those earnings 
can be used for essential imports. The poorer the country and the more 
foreign exchange constrained, the starker and more costly in human terms, 
are the constraints imposed by high external debt service burdens.
What is needed today to enhance the chances of survival of poor children 
in poor countries - and especially of the children of Sub-Saharan Africa 
- is not an elaborate, theoretical, intellectual exposition of the points 
made above. The case for them coincides both with common sense and with 
human values and is increasingly generally accepted. The pressing 
question - for many children, the life and death question - is what is to 
be done? How can a substantial, effective augmentation of resources 
devoted to child focused programmes be secured promptly and sustained 
over at least the next five years? One answer - and one relating 
directly to government budget and foreign exchange constraints - is debt 
relief. Poor countries do not have high absolute volumes of debt when 
compared with, e.g. Brazil, Mexico, the Venezeula or South Korea. But in 
their own terms - in relation to their government revenues and export 
earnings - their debt service burdens are often even greater and, because 
they are so much poorer, even less sustainable. Nowhere is this truer 
than in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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9. The principle of partial forgiveness of external debt for low income
countries has been accepted for at least half a decade. For example, 
Retrospective Terms Adjustment of bilateral aid credits (loan to grant) 
has already been applied by a majority of OECD members in respect to many 
-though not all - poor countries. That debt relief has been used both to 
fund the local counterpart of external resource flows directed to 
development programmes and to loosening import constraints. What is new 
in this proposal is the concept of partial debt relief specifically
focused on child survival. To achieve a basis for reasoned dialogue and
for mobilisation of support what is necessary is a broad framework 
showing how much, from whom to whom and how programmed.
10. The logical first question is which economies - and thus which children -
should benefit from such a programme. Two possibilities deserving 
consideration are:
a. All countries with 1984 per capita gross national product at or below 
$1,000; or
b. All Sub-Saharan African countries with 1984 per capita GNP at or 
below $ 1,000.
Any cut off point is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. However, the Annex 
1 country list shows that the $1,000 level does include almost all really 
poor, resource constrained economies now unable to increase child 
survival focused programmes substantially. In Sub-Saharan Africa for
example all the countries except Gabon, Congo and Mauritius are covered. 
[Globally there are a few cases - e.g. Jamaica - just above the cutoff 
which may deserve special treatement but the broad division does make 
sense.]
11. The case for special debt relief resources for low income countries has 
been widely made, for example in recent World Bank and Commonwealth 
Secretariat Studies. Similarly the same case has recently been made by 
the Catholic Pontifical Commission, in At the Service of the Human 
Community: An Ethical Approach to the International Debt Question, which 
concludes "the creditor States will need to pay special attention to the 
poorest countries. In certain cass, they could convert the loans into
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grants." Similar conclusions have been reacted by the economic advisory 
group and central committee of the World Council of Churches over 
1984-85.
12. Low income debtors, especially in Africa, differ fundamentally in their 
problems from other developing country debtors because of the long term 
and deep crises of extreme poverty which they face. Therefore special 
partial relief for their debt will not represent any precedent for 
handling the quite different problems of upper middle income debtor 
countries.
13. Parallel to who receives is the question which countries should provide 
debt forgiveness. Partial forgiveness by countries with 1984 gross 
national product per capita of $4,000 or more would appear an equitable 
and manageable target. As Annex 2 list shows, countries above that 
cutoff point could afford to make such a contribution without significant 
sacrifices or risks to their own economies.
14. Having defined which economies should receive and which forgive, the next
question is how much debt relief. A reasonable level - bearing in mind 
the needs of the poor countries for additional resources to invest in 
their children's future and of the costs to forgiving states and/or 
institutions is 5% computed on the December 31» 1986 levels of
outstanding external debt in the categories agreed for inclusion.
15. How to transfer the resources allocated and over what time period is an 
important question. The transfer in terms of real resources available 
for spending occurs over the period and to the extent that debt service 
payments are reduced, rather than at the point in time of the initial 
bookkeeping entry reducing principal or future debt service payments due. 
The most appropriate method appears to be to compute the 5% on December 
31, 1986 principal (including arrears of both principal and interest at 
that date) outstanding and to transfer it by five annual reductions of 
debt service payments each equivalent in amount to 1 % of the base on
which the forgiveness is computed. This would provide predictable, 
comparable flows for a five year augmentation of child focused programmes 
in poor countries and afford time to the forgiving countries and
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r institutions to manage the accounting and financial implications of that
forgiveness gradually.
16. As in all designated resource transfers the question of ensuring 
additionality arises in respect of both recipients and forgivers. 
Forgivers will, quite reasonably, want assurance that poor children in 
poor countries are benefitting. Recipients will need a programming frame 
to ensure that poor children do benefit and that the resources available 
are deployed efficiently for that purpose. Equally it is important to 
ensure that the forgiveness does provide genuinely additional transfers 
and not simply a reallocation of existing levels of concessional resource 
transfers.
17. On the recipient side this can be achieved through a National Child 
Survival Fund. The domestic counterpart of the external debt service 
forgiven would automatically be paid into this fund as that debt service 
fell due. This would provide non-inflationary domestic funding for 
enhanced child focused programming. However, in cases in which 
additional external concessional finance for expanded child focused 
programmes was not adequate to cover their import content, a proportion 
of the fund would need to be earmarked in foreign exchange. Some net 
foreign exchange saving would in any case remain for general augmentation 
of import capacity for other critical goods.
18. The national fund would normally have a small technical secretariat to 
allocate the resources to augmented child focused programmes, to 
coordinate operational institution planning and programming and - if 
appropriate - to provide technical expertise toward efficient child 
focusedprogramme identification, articulation and initial operation. The 
overall programme would be subject to approval prior to disbursement by a 
committee made up of representatives of the recipient government, the 
appropriate regional development bank and UNICEF. This process, while 
financially separate, would take place within the country’s macro 
economic and budgetary processes.
19. On the forgiving government side a commitment to increase concessional 
resources voted for low income countries by the amount of the debt 
service foregone (or to write off debt service without charging it to the
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* aid budget) is needed to ensure additionality. In addition there would
be a need for these governments to allocate modest additional resources 
for technical assistance to those recipient countries - especially but 
not only in Sub-Saharan Africa - requiring help in the rapid 
identification, design, articulation and/or initial implementation of 
significantly expanded, cost efficient child focused programmes.
20. The foregoing provides a practicable approach to setting up and operating 
a five year programme of debt relief for child survival effective January 
1, 1988 either for all poor countries or for those of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
It is also necessary to address the question of coverage - i.e. what 
categories of debt should be eligible for abatement (partial forgiveness) 
of service payments?
21. As a first step it may be useful to identify excluded categories;
a. IMF drawings and Trust Fund credits;
b. World Bank and South regional or sub-regional development banks (e.g. 
IADB, Asian Devbank, African Devbank, Caricom Bank, East African 
Development Bank, BADEA). However, in respect to concessional 
lending wholly financed from government grants (e.g. IDA) the issue 
of abatement might be reconsidered if it would not seriously affect 
their future concessional lending programmes;
c. commercial trade credits (bank and other enterprise) of an initial 
duration of one year or less. If these are being serviced, attempts 
at achieving foregiveness could seriously jeopardise continued trade 
finance. [However, the abatement of payments on arrears on such 
credits (as of December 1986) might be worth consideration if the 
practical difficulties of identifying such credits and their sources 
and of arranging modalities for forgiveness can be overcome.]
22. At a minimum what should be included are all government to government (or 
public sector entity) loans and credits made, or guaranteed by, forgiving 
country governments or their external financing or guarantee 
instrumentalities (specifically including export finance loans and 
guarantees).
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23- this leaves commercial bank (and other enterprise) loans of an initial 
maturity of one year or more. A strong case for their inclusion can be 
made. In some poor countries - including some even in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, e.g. Sudan, Zaire, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Zambia - these loans 
do account for a significant proportion of the debt service burden. A 
writeoff of 1$ a year of December 31, 1986 principal against service
receipts of 1988-1992 would not therefore clearly compromise the 
viability and profitability of creditor enterprises, especially if 
forgiving states took simple legislation to make the amounts so abated 
unambiguously deductible for company tax purposes. This is especially 
true because the lenders already view low income country debt as worth 
much less than face value - rarely as high as 75% and sometimes 10% or 
less (see Annex 2 for examples.). Indeed, it has been reported that 
several creditor banks have begun to explore the possibility of granting 
some debt relief to very poor countries on a charitable basis. This 
scheme would thus provide an appropriate framework for such action. 
However, the agreement and early implementation of abatement on 
government and government guaranteed debt should not be delayed by debate 
on inclusion of commercial loans. These can be included at a second 
stage - say January 1, 1989 - after there has been time for modalities to 
be articulated. If this proves impossible, commercial debt could be 
excluded from the scheme or provided for on a voluntary basis.
24. The proposals set out above are therefore for four alternative schemes. 
In order of rising ambitiousness - and contibution to child survival and 
development - they are:
a. all government and government guaranteed loans to poor countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (of the order of $1,400 million in total or $280 
million a year);
b. all government and government guaranteed loans to all poor countries 
(of the order of $4,900 million or $1,180 million a year);
c. all government, government guaranteed and one year or more initial 
duration commercial bank and other enterprise loans to all poor 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (of the order of $2,650 million or
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$530 million a year);
d. all government, government guaranteed and one year or more initial 
duration loans to all poor countries (of the ordjer of $9,000 million 
or $1,800 million a year).
I
The population of the proposed forgiving countries is 
so that the annual per capita cost to them would b< 
even on the most inclusive proposal.
about 1,000 million 
less than of $2.00
25. Debt Relief for child survival in low income dountries would not 
prejudice working out more general debt overhang relief, rescheduling and
management problems. 1Í of principal a year abater lent of debt service 
for five years would not pre-empt or preclude Pari:; Club reschedulings 
even with a longer grace period and more generous ferms than have been 
the practice to date. A limited, specific purpose 
does not encourge general default (if anything
partial forgiveness 
t discourages both
general default and random non-payment) nor does it s 2t any precedent for
more general debt renegotiation. Nor would a 5J6 of principal abatement
of debt service forestall or be a substitute for seeking retrospective
terms adjustment for low income countries from those creditors who have
not yet granted it (e.g. USSR, Japan, USA) or for the broadening of 
countries eligible by these creditors which have made; the adjustments for 
a particularly small group of countries (e.g. Federal Germany).
26. Because poor countries (as defined above) represent a small proportion of 
commercial bank portfolios of sovereign risk lending a writeoff 
equivalent to 1Í a year of principal a year for five years allowable for 
tax relief would not have an impact even remotely comparable to 
non-performance by a major middle income debtor country. The adoption of
a cutoff date well before the scheme comes into effect and prior to its
Iproposal (January 1, 1987) means that it should not deter new government
i
and government guaranteed export credit lending flows because servicing 
of lending subsequent to December 31, 1986 would not be affected. For 
poor countries the return to normal market borrowing lease against debt or
debt service forgiveness is unreal. Few if any of these countries will
<
be judged credit worthy by commercial lenders in the foreseeable future. 
Almost equally few could afford to borrow at anything like present real
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commercial interest rates with repayment in normal commercial loan time 
frames. If one or two did achieve sudden breakthroughs and emerged in 
the mid-1990s with $1,500 or above GNP per capita (at 1984 prices), a 
healthy external balance based on rapidly rising exports and had major 
attractive investment possibilities, it is exceedingly improbable that 
they would in fact be denied access to credit markets because of a 
limited, defined purpose debt service abatement under very different 
circumstances almost a decade earlier. The present proposal has been 
formulated so that it can be judged on its own merits without worrying 
about any untoward precedent setting in other contexts.
27• Defining the scope of national child survival development programmes can 
only be done in detail at country level by the national governments in 
consultation with the appropriate regional development banks and UNICEF 
once abatement resource flows are known. However it is possible to 
identify some elements likely to be included in many programmes as 
indicative examples:
a. vaccination and immunisation programmes (vaccines, syringes, 
equipment, vehicles, refrigerators, training, personnel);
b. oral rehydration (salts and provision for their local production);
c. primary health care more generally including mother and child ante 
and post natal clinics (equipment, basic drugs, simple buildings, 
transport, personnel and training);
d. pure water provision - especially rehabilitation of endangered or 
disabled village and rural supplies (pumps and spares, pipe, labour, 
training for village maintenance and management, especially for women 
who are the main users);
e. support for women's acquisition and use of improved food processing 
and preservation (e.g weaning foods, fish smoking) technology and 
equipment both to improve household nutrition directly by 
self-provisioning and to generate additional income to buy food, 
clothing, medical fees, school fees and educational materials for 
their children;
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f. development of a vulnerable group nutrition and health oriented 
component in food security early warning systems (an agreed priority 
of FAO-WHO-UNICEF and also of several Sub-Saharan African States and 
at least one sub-regional organisation);
g. pilot poor household food production or other income generation 
schemes (tools, seed, training, working capital, materials) including 
small scale labour intensive public works during the agricultural 
’’dead seasons” when both income levels and nutrition are usually at 
their lowest).
28. What the proposed debt forgiveness for child survival would mean can be 
illustrated by a hypothetical poor, Sub-Saharan African country. Its 
broad macro economic parameters are set out in Annex 3 and are fairly 
typical except that at 20 million it is rather above average population. 
Abatement of debt service government and government guaranteed loans
alone would yield about $17.5 million a year for 5 years and of
government and commercial of about $22.5 million a year over the same 
period. This would allow an increase in spending on programmes such as 
those sketched above of about 58Í a year on government loan abatement and 
of 71% on government and commercial. The relative increases speak for 
themselves. The absolute magnitudes can be compared with the $5 million 
a year which has proved adequate in Tanzania (a comparable country) to 
restore primary health care basic drug supply nationally and to the $12¿ 
million odd needed annually to restore drug supply, near universal child 
vaccination, basic rural primary health care services and personnel
retraining in the same country. Individual women’s projects of the type 
cited have cost perhaps $1,00-$2,000 a year for two years in each village 
in which they have been established in Ghana. Where shallow wells, 
spring protection, short pipelines or rehabilitation of existing deep
wells are practicable the initial cost of rehabilitating and safeguarding 
pure water supplies is usually not over $10 per family and the subsequent 
recurrent cost (excluding fuel if required) perhaps $1 per family per 
year including maintenance to judge by Ghana and Tanzania estimates.
29. Child survival is vital to the future of poor people in poor countries. 
Low cost ways of enhancing it are known and have proven their relevance
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and efficiency in practice. Both in poor countries and in rich there is 
a real human concern and commitment to the welfare of children. The 
major barriers to achieving enhanced child survial in poor countries are 
government budget and foreign exchange constraints. One way to loosen 
these constraints is to abate external debt servicing requirements which 
are a heavy, often a grievous, burden on both budgets and foreign 
exchange supplies in poor countries. That option most certainly is 
within human reach. The choice really is ours. In the words of an 
African statesman known for his commitment to child survival and 
development, Julius Nyerere, "To plan is to choose, choose to go 
forward."
Proposed Beneficiaries/Forgivers 
Countries GNP per capita below $1,000 per annum (1984)
ANNEX 1
9
Country Per capita GDP
Ethiopia* 100
Afghanistan 120
Bangladesh 130
Mali* 140
Zaire* 140
Chad* 150
Burkina Faso* 160
Nepal 160
Burma 180
Malawi* 180
Mozambique* 180
Equatorial Guinea* 180
Guinea Bissau* 190
Niger* 190
Comoros* 200
Tanzania* 210
Burundi* 220
Uganda* 230
Togo* 250
Central African Republic* 260
The Gambia* 260
India 260
Madagascar* 260
Somalia* 260
Benin* 270
Rwanda* 280
China 310
Kenya* • 310
Sierra Leone* 310
Cape Verde* 320
Haiti 320
Guinea* 330
Sao Tome and Principe* 330
Ghana* 350
Sri Lanka 360
Sudan* 360
Pakistan 380
Senegal* 380
Mauritania* 450
Liberia* 470
/b
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Country Per capita GDP
Zambia* 470
Lesotho* 530
Bolivia 540
Indonesia 540
Yemen Arab Republic 550
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic 550
Guyana 590
Angola* 600 *
Cote d'Ivoire* 610
Philippines 660
Morocco 670
Honduras 700
El Salvador 7 10
Papua New Guinea 710
Egypt 720
Nigeria* 730 *
Seychelles* 750
Zimbabwe* 760
Swaziland* 790
Cameroon* 800
St. Vincent & Grenadines 840
Grenada 860
Nicaragua 860
Thailand 860
Botswana* 960
Dominican Republic 970
Kampuchea ? (120) ?
Laos ? (120) ?
Vietnam ? (150) ?
* = Sub-Saharan Africa
= 1986 per capita substantially lower because of oil price fall.
Countries GNP per capita above $4,000 per annum (1984)
Gabon* 4,100
Barbados 4,370
Spain 4,440
Ireland 4,970
Israel 5,060
Hong Kong 6,330
Italy 6,420
Oman 6,490
Bahamas 6,690
Trinidad and Tobago 7,150
/c
Singapore 7,260
New Zealand 7,730
Libya 8,520 *
United Kingdom 8,750
Belgium 8,610
Austria 9,140
Netherlands 9,520
France 9,760
Bahrain 10,470 *
Saudi Arabia 10,530 *
Japan 10,630
Finland 10,770
Iceland 11,020
West Germany 11,130
Denmark 11,170
Australia 11,740
Sweden 11,860
Luxembourg 13,160
Canada 13,280
Norway 13,940
United States 15,390
Switzerland 16,330
Kuwait 19,810 *
Qatar 19,810 *
United Arab Emirates 21,920 *
USSR ?
German Democratic Republic ?
Czechoslovakia ?
Hungary ?
Source: IBRD, World Development Report 1986 and own estimates for
countries not covered.
ANNEX 2
Second Hand Bank Loan Prices - Poor Countries 
($ of face value)
Country Bid Asked
Bolivia 7 8
Dominican Republic 45 47
Guyana 60 64
Ivory Coast 76 78
Liberia NB 8
Madagascar 65 68
Malawi 74 77
Morocco 68 71
Nicaragua 4 7
Nigeria 36 42
Senegal 64 66
Sudan NB 10
Togo 68 70
Zaire 25 30
Zambia 18 22
NB= No Bidders
Source: Salomon Brothers, December 1986
Hypothetical Poor Sub-Saharan Africa Case
ANNEX 3
Population 20 million
GNP/per capita $250 (GNP $5,000 million)
Eligible external Debt:
a. government/government guaranteed
b. "a" plus commercial of one year or 
above initial duration
Debt Service Eligible For Abatement
a. government/government guaranteed 
(assuming average interest 4Í, average
duration 15 years with 20$ still 
in grace period)
b. "a" plus commercial (assuming average 
interest 12¿$, average duration 6 years)
$1,750 million 
$2,250 million
$163 million
$239 million
Actual Annual Abatement (Benefit To Recipients/Cost To Creditors)
a. government/government guaranteed 
(assuming average interest 4$, average
duration 15 years with 20$ still 
in grace period)
b. "a" plus commercial (assuming average 
interest 12¿$, average duration 6 years)
Annual Recurrent Budget
Of Which Child Focused Programmes
Enhancement Possible In Child Focused Programmes
a. government/government guaranteed 
(assuming average interest 4$, average
duration 15 years with 20$ still 
in grace period)
b. "a" plus commercial (assuming average 
interest 12¿%, average duration 6 years)
$17.5 million
$22.5 million 
$750 million 
$30 million
59$
71$
The assumed debt service figures are broadly consistent with the profiles of 
most poor countries. Actual debt service may be lower in cases in which 
recent reschedulings have been agreed but is unlikely to be less than the 
abatement target.
The per cent on child focused programmes depends both on the country and on 
how broadly such programmes are defined. However, 4$ of total recurrent 
budget expenditure appears on inspection of UNICEF country situation reports 
to be - if anything - an above average figure.
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ANNEX 4
Poor Country External Debt Totals 
($ USA 000,000,000)
1. 2. 3.
Bilateral Official, Commercial, Commercial, Total
publically publically non­
guaranteed guaranteed guaranteed
Total 5% Total 5% Total 5% Total 5%
All Developing
Countries 162.1 363.8 99.0 624.9
All Poor 
Countries 97.1 4.9 64.1 3.2 18.9 1.0 180.1 9.0
Poor Sub-Saharan 
African 
Countries 28.1 1.4 22.3 1.1 2.9 0.1 53-3 2.65
Sources: IBRD, World Debt Tables, 1986-8 7. In most cases 31 December 1985
estimates. To this was added figures for Mozambique from the 
Institute for International Economics (IIE)fs Special Report 5 (May 
1986), edited by Carol Lancaster and John Williamson and a rough 
estimate of 2 billion for Angola based on OAU/ECA estimates and 
assumed to be overwhemingly bilateral official, largely export 
credits.
Notes:
1. Official publicly guaranteed debts means debts outstanding and disbursed 
from official creditors, which are owed or guaranteed by government 
agencies. Includes arrears of principal but excludes interest arrears.
2. Commercial, publicly guaranteed debts means debts outstanding and 
disbursed from private creditors (suppliers or financial markets), which 
are owed or guaranteed by government agencies. Includes principal, 
excludes interest arrears.
3. Private, non-guaranteed debts means debts outstanding and disbursed to 
private agencies and not subject to government guarantees.
4. All debts of less than 12 months’ initial maturity are excluded including 
trade arrears.
5. Poor countries are those with a per capita annual gross domestic product
in 1984 of less than USA $1,000 according to the IBRD's figures.
6. The IBRD table gives no figure for Morocco under column 3, while the H E
does not distinguish between Mozambique's guaranteed and non-guaranteed 
commercial debts; the latter total $1.68 billion and have all been 
included in column 2.
/ii
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7. Because of non-availability of reliable estimates the external debt totals 
do not include the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Bhutan,
Brunei, Cuba, Kampuchea, North Korea, Laos, Mongolia, Tonga and Vietnam. 
Debts owed to CMEA member states are not included for the same reason.
8. The IBRD gives no estimate of GNP per capita for Djibouti, the Solomon 
Islands or Western Samoa beyond placing them in the "middle income" 
cateogory, i.e. between $400 and about $8,000 annual income per capita. 
Debts owed by all three have been included, but are not significant 
relative to the totals for all poor countries or those in SSA.
9. "Poor" countries outside Africa owe more than those in Africa because they
include Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, the Philippines and Thailand, all of 
which owe substantial external debts absolutely and relative to their GDP 
and export levels as well as India, China and Pakistan which have
substantial absolute external debts although ones much lower in relation
to GDP and exports.
10. All figures have been rounded.
